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Congressional Authority to Regulate the
Use of Nuclear Weapons
By ALLAN IDES*
"The constitution supposes, what the history of all Governments demon-
strates, that the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war,
and most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the
question of war in the Legislature."-- James Madison'
Introduction
The image of the presidential finger gripping the nuclear trigger is
perhaps somewhat simplistic; but it does reflect, more accurately than
not, a fatalistic national concession that the ultimate decision on nuclear
war rests on the shoulders of one somewhat isolated human being and his
or her small coterie of chosen advisors. This human being, prior to the
moment of consecration, will likely have had little or no experience in
and may possess only the most superficial knowledge of nuclear weap-
onry, strategy, tactics, and the ultimate consequences of a nuclear strike.
Whether good or bad, we do not elect Presidents because of their special
expertise in this delicate realm. The vagaries of presidential politics se-
lect the finger; we supply the trigger and our prayers. A more sensible
approach is plainly needed.
Dr. Jeremy J. Stone, a mathematician and director of the Federation
of American Scientists, has introduced a proposal that challenges long
held assumptions regarding both the scope of presidential prerogative
over the nuclear arsenal and the role of Congress in regulating the use of
that arsenal. In his article, "Presidential First Use is Unlawful," Dr.
Stone proposes the creation of a special committee of Congress that
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. B.A., 1971, University of
California, Los Angeles; M.A., 1973, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles; J.D., 1979,
Loyola Law School. The author is grateful to his colleagues, Arthur Frakt, Fred Lower and
Chris May for their helpful comments and criticisms, to Professor Peter Raven-Hansen of the
George Washington Law School for his invaluable input and support, and to Tzivia Schwartz
and Allyson Saunders for their assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (April 2, 1798), reprinted in VI
MADISON, WRITINGS 312 (G. Hunt ed. 1906).
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would, to some degree, regulate the "first use" of nuclear weapons.2 By
definition the proposal does not apply to situations in which the nation
has been attacked by nuclear forces, nor does it prevent a preemptive
nuclear strike ordered by the President if in his judgment a nuclear at-
tack has been launched against the United States.3 But even without di-
rectly challenging presidential authority over the use of nuclear weapons
under all circumstances, the proposal would inject Congress into what
has been assumed to be a sacrosanct presidential sphere; and in so doing,
it could tread upon the conventional wisdom about presidential war-
making powers.
Dr Stone's proposal is as follows:
In any given conflict or crisis whatsoever, and notwithstand-
ing any other authority, so long as no nuclear weapons have been
used by others, the President shall not use nuclear weapons with-
out consulting with, and securing the assent of a majority of, a
committee [composed of the speaker and minority leader of the
House of Representatives, the majority and minority leaders of the
Senate, and the chairman and ranking member of the Senate and
House committees on armed services, the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, the House Committee on International Rela-
tions, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Moreover,]
nothing herein shall preclude the President from using nuclear
weapons first if Congress adopts a declaration of war that explicitly
suspends the authority granted in this act.4
In essence, the proposal bans the first use of nuclear weapons and at the
same time empowers a committee of Congress to rescind that ban. The
proposal is both creative and controversial. Not the least of the contro-
versies centers upon its constitutionality. Indeed, not only does the pro-
posal raise constitutional issues specific to itself, it raises more far-
reaching constitutional questions regarding the relative roles of Congress
and the President in the realm of nuclear war-making.
In assessing these constitutional issues, the primary question is not
whether presidential first use is unlawful, but whether Congress has the
constitutional authority to regulate the use of nuclear weapons and, if so,
whether the Stone proposal is a constitutional exercise of that authority.
Importantly, the task is not to determine whether this proposal is the
appropriate constitutional response to nuclear weapons technology or
whether the proposal is somehow necessary to establish the primacy of
2. Stone, Presidential First Use is Unlawful, 56 FOREIGN POL'Y 94 (1984).
3. Under such circumstances, in Dr. Stone's view, the President would have the constitu-
tional and statutory authority to order the immediate use of nuclear weapons. Iad at 96; see
also F.A.S. Public Interest Report, at 10 (Sept. 1984).
4. Stone, supra note 2, at 107.
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Congress over the President. Rather, the inquiry is whether Congress, as
the lawmaking branch of the national government, may take a more ac-
tive role in the regulation of nuclear weapons use and, more specifically,
whether this proposal or some reasonable variation of it is within our
constitutional framework. Once the threshold of constitutional plausibil-
ity is crossed, the decision to adopt such a proposal is classically political:
the choice is within the discretion vested in the political branches, and
particularly, in Congress.5
This Article first examines the basic structure of separation of pow-
ers, with particular emphasis on the legislative authority of Congress and
the derivative authority of the President to execute the policies adopted
by Congress. Consideration is given to Madison's aphorism that in our
government the legislative authority "predominates." Next, the relation-
ship between the separation of powers principles and the division of au-
thority in the war-making context is considered. The Article concludes
that the basic structure of separation of powers is fully applicable in the
war-making context as a matter of constitutional principle, text, and his-
tory. This being the case, Congress appears to possess ample legislative
authority to regulate the use of nuclear weapons, including a complete
ban on their use. In adopting such a ban, Congress would not violate any
constitutional prerogative of the executive branch. Finally, objections to
the seemingly more modest device of committee approval of first use are
considered in terms of potential violations of presidential prerogative and
excessive delegations of legislative authority to a committee.
I. Allocations of Constitutional Authority
A. The Basic Structure
This inquiry begins with what may seem to be fairly simple proposi-
tions regarding the nature of congressional authority. These proposi-
tions, however, form the necessary predicate for consideration of more
complicated questions of congressional power raised by Dr. Stone's pro-
posal. The central theme of what follows is that Congress was designed
to be the primary and predominant policy-making institution of the na-
tional government. The bases for that theme are the text and history of
the Constitution and judicial construction of its separation of powers
doctrine.
The legislative authority conferred by the Constitution is reposed in
5. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
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Congress.6 That authority, which is in essence the power to make law,
may be exercised over all matters enumerated in Article I, section 8 of
the Constitution, including the powers to create and support a military
establishment and the power to declare war. Congressional legislative
authority over these matters is plenary. For example, Article I, section 8
gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce; thus, there is
no aspect of interstate commerce over which Congress may not legislate.
Congress may choose to regulate or not to regulate; Congress may pro-
mote or ban; it may move incrementally or precipitously. Similarly, with
respect to the powers over military affairs, Congress may create an army
or decline to do so; it may fund a weapons system or ban basic research
on that system; Congress may declare war or refuse to so declare. More-
over, Congress may select any means it deems appropriate to accomplish
the ends it desires so long as those ends are consistent with the vast array
of powers and procedures granted to the national government. 7 Con-
gress has only three limitations on its pervasive and predominant law-
making authority with respect to the enumerated national powers. First,
Congress may not transgress negative restraints on governmental power,
such as those enumerated in the Bill of Rights or in Article I, section 9.
Second, Congress may not invade the domain of either the executive or
the judiciary by assuming for itself roles specifically assigned to those
branches.8 For example, the Constitution grants to the executive branch
the power to administer and enforce the laws enacted by Congress9 and
to the judicial branch the power to adjudicate matters arising under those
laws and the Constitution."° Neither the executive nor the judiciary is
vested with independent lawmaking authority. Finally, Congress must, in
general, proceed consistently with the procedural limitations imposed by
the Constitution upon the legislative process."
The duties and responsibilities vested in the national government
were not dispersed among the three branches haphazardly. The place-
ment of authority in a particular branch was done consonant with the
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."
7. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 18 (providing Congress with the power "[tlo make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof").
8. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926);
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
9. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
10. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
republican philosophy that animated the framers of the Constitution. As
an abstract proposition, that observation seems obvious; nonetheless it
signifies an essential aspect of our constitutional system: at the very
heart of republican philosophy is the concept of self-governance. As
stated in the Virginia Bill of Rights, "[A]ll power is vested in, and conse-
quently derived from, the people, [and the] magistrates are their trustees
and servants, and at all times amenable to them."12 Consistent with this
philosophy, the Framers of the Constitution adopted a form of govern-
ment in which the most representative branch, Congress, would be em-
powered to create the laws and policies to be advanced by the nation.
The history of the British Constitution was in general a movement
away from monarchy and autocracy toward representative govern-
ment.13 The Framers saw the government they designed as a further step
in that progression, a grand experiment in representative democracy.14
To place the lawmaking authority in either of the other branches would
have been anathema to republicanism and a clear step backwards.15 This
philosophical perspective explains Madison's observation that "[i]n re-
publican government, the legislative authority necessarily predomi-
nates.""I As one commentator has observed, "[N]o one doubted that the
legislature was the most important part of any government."' 17
This is not to deny or disparage the power of the presidency. As a
practical reality that power is enormous. The source of presidential
power, however, is not an amorphous construct of constitutional law.
Rather, the wellspring of presidential power-aside from pure political
clout-is positive law enacted by Congress which defines the scope of
national policy and delegates appropriate authority to the President. In-
deed, over the past one hundred and ninety-eight years much has been
delegated. In addition, as discussed below, the President derives practi-
cal power from the acquiescence of Congress in unilateral presidential
initiative. This acquiescence adds a gloss to express delegations and im-
plies congressional consent to a presidential action. In other words, the
source of presidential power is the accumulated action and inaction of
Congress, not abstract constitutional authorization. The President has
12. VA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
13. See generally D. KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN: 1485-
1951 (8th ed. 1966); W. STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1979); E.
WADE & A. BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th ed. 1965).
14. See A. KOCH, POWER, MORALS, AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: ESSAYS IN THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 103-21 (1961).
15. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 150-73
(1969).
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
17. G. WOOD, supra note 15, at 162.
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no independent power to tax, spend, regulate, impose embargoes, or cre-
ate a military establishment."8 The President's seemingly unilateral au-
thority over these matters, in fact, results from broad delegations, both
express and implied, by Congress. For example, while the recent em-
bargo imposed upon trade with Nicaragua was instigated by the execu-
tive branch, the legitimacy of the embargo derives from specific statutory
delegations of authority. 19 The delegations may be stretched and con-
torted in any particular case, but such efforts to conform prior delega-
tions to present action do not disparage the underlying principle. Indeed,
the contortions are designed to pay obeisance to it.
B. Judicial Affirmation of the Basic Structure
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,2" which involved an at-
tempted exercise of presidential war powers,2 provides a judicial affirma-
18. The Constitution does vest the President with a few narrowly drawn independent
powers. Article II, section 2 grants the President the authority to "require the Opinion, in
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relat-
ing to the Duties of their respective Offices," and the "Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons."
The former involves the internal operations of the executive branch; the latter was considered
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution to be a quintessential executive prerogative.
Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1974), reh'g denied, 420 U.S. 939 (1975); Grupp, Some
Historical Aspects of the Pardon in England, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 51, 55 (1963). Article II,
section 3 imposes the duty upon the President to receive Ambassadors and other public Minis-
ters. This ministerial function has been suggested as an independent authority to recognize
foreign sovereigns, see L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTrrTION 41 & n.*
(1972), but neither the language of the Constitution nor the ratification debates support that
conclusion. See THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 468 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). More-
over, the Supreme Court has never resolved a conflict between Congress and the President on
this issue. Cf Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (issue of whether the President may
terminate a treaty without Congressional review); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942)
(the President is allowed to determine national policy toward Soviet nationalization without
Senate approval); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (the President could recog-
nize and establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union without the consent or advice of
the Senate). Finally, the President has the power to remove officers of the executive branch.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). But see Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295
U.S. 602 (1935) (no power to remove officer of independent regulatory agency).
19. Exec. Order No. 12,513, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 566 (May 1, 1985).
20. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
21. A number of commentators have assumed that Youngstown is a domestic separation
of powers case, implying that some other structure of separation may apply in the foreign
policy context. However, the Supreme Court expressly relied upon Youngstown in Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), which plainly involved separation of powers in the field
of foreign affairs. In addition, nothing in the text of the Constitution indicates that the separa-
tion of powers would take on a different meaning in the foreign policy context. Article I,
section 8 grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce as well as the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations. The President's independent powers over foreign
commerce are no more extensive than the President's independent powers over interstate com-
merce. Both derive from the President's power to administer the laws passed by Congress.
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tion of these basic structural principles. The facts are well known. Just
prior to the commencement of a nationwide steel strike in 1952, Presi-
dent Truman ordered the Secretary of Commerce to seize the nation's
steel mills. Truman believed that the strike would seriously jeopardize
the war effort in Korea. The mill owners immediately sought an injunc-
tion. They argued "that the President's order amounts to lawmaking, a
legislative function which the Constitution has expressly confided to the
Congress and not to the President. '2 2 In fact, the government did not
claim that the President's order was authorized by any legislation.
Rather, the government argued that the President's "action was neces-
sary to avert a national catastrophe which would inevitably result from a
stoppage of steel production, and that in meeting this grave emergency
the President was acting within the aggregate of his constitutional pow-
ers as the Nation's Chief Executive and the Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces of the United States." 23
The Court's opinion, authored by Justice Black, focused on the gov-
ernment's concession that no act of Congress had authorized the action
taken by the President. In light of that, the sole question was whether
the Constitution authorized the seizure. Justice Black rejected outright
the government's reliance on inherent powers of the Commander in
Chief. The decision of whether to permit such a taking of private prop-
erty was a "job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authori-
ties."24 At a later point in his opinion, Justice Black made it clear that
Congress would have had ample authority to permit the seizure. 25 In so
doing, he underscored the constitutional demarcations of authority. If
Congress had authorized the seizure, the President could have acted
upon that authorization. In the absence of Congressional authorization,
the President simply lacked the power.
Justice Black also rejected the government's argument that the vest-
ing of "the executive power" in the President supported the seizure:
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see
that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be
a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmak-
ing process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the
vetoing of laws he thinks bad.2 6
That the President had overstepped those bounds by the seizure was evi-
dent. As Justice Black observed:
22. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 587.
25. Id. at 588.
26. Id. at 587.
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The preamble of the order itself, like that of many statutes, sets out
reasons why the President believes certain policies should be
adopted, proclaims these policies as rules of conduct to be fol-
lowed, and again, like a statute, authorizes a government official to
promulgate additional rules and regulations consistent with the
policy proclaimed and needed to carry that policy into execution.
The Court held that this lawmaking role assumed by the President was
one to be performed by "Congress alone in both good and bad times."28
An emergency did not alter the scheme of separation of powers.
Justice Black's opinion can be criticized for not taking into account
certain practical realities,29 despite the fact that it closely followed the
basic constitutional structure of our government. Justice Jackson, in a
concurring opinion, did address those realities. Justice Jackson proposed
a three-tiered model of presidential authority. First, when the President
acts with the express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority
is at its apex.3 0 Second, when the President acts in the absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority, he acts within a zone of twi-
light in which authority is uncertain.31 Third, when the President acts in
contravention of the implied or express will of Congress, his authority is
at its nadir.32
Justice Jackson's first and third categories are essentially identical to
Justice Black's model. In the first category, when Congress has author-
ized presidential action, the question is not one of separation of powers,
but of national power. Accordingly, the inquiry focuses on the enumera-
tion of substantive powers, not on the roles of the two branches. An
affirmative grant of authority from Congress gives the President the
power to act. In the third category, the President is free to act contrary
to the will of Congress only when the act is pursuant to the exclusive
executive powers.33 In all other circumstances, to sustain presidential
action contrary to legislation would unite the lawmaking and law en-
forcement powers in one person, a situation quite at odds with the most
fundamental constitutional principles.
Writing in the Federalist Papers, James Madison stated:
The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judi-
ciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and
27. Id. at 588.
28. Id. at 589.
29. See, e.g., Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451,
472 (1979).
30. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-36 (Jackson, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 637.
32. Id. at 637-38.
33. See supra note 18.
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whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pro-
nounced the very definition of tyranny.
... The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim
[on separation of powers] are a further demonstration of his mean-
ing. "When the legislative and executive powers are united in the
same person or body" says he, "there can be no liberty, because
apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should
enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner."
(Emphasis in original.)3 4
Similarly, Justice Jackson made it clear that he was quite reluctant ever
to uphold such sweeping presidential prerogative: "Presidential claim to
a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with
caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our consti-
tutional system."3 The equilibrium to which Justice Jackson alludes is,
of course, the demarcation between legislative and executive authority.36
The main difference between the majority and concurring opinions
is Justice Jackson's recognition of a "zone of twilight," which would per-
mit the Executive to take action when Congress has not expressly forbid-
den the action. One must be careful, however, to understand the extent
of this seeming permissiveness. Justice Jackson explained the second tier
as a practical reality, not as a constitutional doctrine: "[C]ongressional
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential re-
sponsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on
the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than
on abstract theories of law."37 In other words, even though the Constitu-
tion may impose the responsibility upon Congress, a failure to exercise
that responsibility will invite the executive to assume the dormant power.
Justice Jackson further observed:
But I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep
power in the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meet-
ing its problems. A crisis that challenges the President equally, or
perhaps primarily, challenges Congress. If not good law, there was
worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that "The
tools belong to the man who can use them." We may say that
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324, 326 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
35. 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring).
36. In an analogous context, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held an executive
agreement inconsistent with an act of Congress void. United States v. Guy W. Capps, 204
F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955). Although Professor
Louis Henkin disagrees with some of the broader assertions in the Capps opinion, he appears to
concede that a contemporaneous or subsequent act of Congress would supersede a contrary
executive agreement. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 180, 184-87
(1972).
37. 343 U.S. at 637 (emphasis added).
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power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Con-
gress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping
through its fingers.38
Justice Jackson's observations regarding the practical consequences
of a congressional failure to exercise authority ring true. It is a fact of
modern politics that the executive is the focal point of national attention
on political matters: when a problem of national dimension arises, the
nation instinctively turns to the President. If the problem is an emer-
gency calling for an immediate response and if Congress has provided no
express authority to act, Justice Jackson correctly observed that the Pres-
ident is invited, if not pulled, into the breach. But even under these cir-
cumstances, every effort should be made to find or create at least tacit
congressional approval. Usually some remnant of delegation can be
discovered.
Dames & Moore v. Regan39 is an excellent example of this phenome-
non. The case involved a challenge to the agreement negotiated by the
Carter administration for the release of the American hostages held by
Iran. The Supreme Court engaged in a masterful exercise of statutory
construction to find congressional support for the President's action.
Some components of the agreement were well within the letter of the law;
others were not. Particularly suspect was the provision for the suspen-
sion of claims against Iran pending in American courts. The Court
found that although neither the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act nor the Hostage Act provided "specific authorization" for
the suspension of those claims,' these acts were not irrelevant in that
they generally indicated "congressional acceptance of a broad scope for
executive action in circumstances such as those presented in this case."41
This implied congressional acquiescence, coupled with a long history of
congressional support for the presidential settlement of private claims
against foreign powers and the absence of any specific prohibition, indi-
cated congressional affirmation of presidential authority under the
circumstances. 42
In terms of raw constitutional power, the Court was careful to em-
phasize the narrowness of its decision:
We do not decide that the President possesses plenary power to
settle claims, even as against foreign governmental entities. ...
But where, as here, the settlement of claims has been determined to
38. Id. at 654.
39. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
40. Id. at 675-76.
41. Id. at 677.
42. Id. at 686.
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be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy
dispute between our country and another, and where, as here, we
can conclude that Congress acquiesced in the President's action,
we are not prepared to say that the President lacks the power to
settle such claims.43
In other words, the President's power to enter this specific agreement
found its source in a combination of congressional action and passivity
underscored by the absence of any express or implied rejection of the
methods adopted by the President. 4 In the words of the Court, "Cru-
cial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly
approved the practice of the claim settlement by executive agreement. '45
The Court's careful effort in Dames & Moore to find a congressional
source for the President's action without establishing independent presi-
dential authority to settle claims underscores the view that primary re-
sponsibility for exercising national power rests in Congress. The zone of
twilight exists only beyond the rim of congressional action and even then
the extent of the zone is defined by the tacit position of Congress articu-
lated in marginally relevant statutes and patterns of acquiescence.
Youngstown thus provides an important structural model for two
reasons. First, both the opinion of the Court and the concurrence of
Justice Jackson recognized that it is Congress and not the President that
is vested with lawmaking authority; this ordering of responsiblity re-
quires the President to take his cues from Congress. Justice Jackson
seemed to accept the theoretical possibility of affirming presidential ac-
tion taken contrary to the legislated will of Congress, but he conceded
the difficulty and rarity of such theoretical possibilities and gave no ex-
amples.46 This first aspect of Youngstown depicts a model of congres-
sional superiority based upon the lawmaking function of Congress.
Second, Justice Jackson alone recognized that as a practical matter,
congressional failure to exercise its legislative responsibility may invite
presidential intrusions onto congressional turf. He emphasized the
responsibilty of Congress to legislate with respect to emergencies in order
43. Id. at 688.
44. In United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915), the Supreme Court adopted
a similar approach in upholding an executive order that withdrew certain public lands from
private oil exploration. The Court explained that the executive action was of a type in which
Congress had long acquiesced and that Congress had not specifically prohibited the action
taken. Id. at 474, 479. There was, according to the Court, an implied grant of authority. Id. at
474-75.
45. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680.
46. Both the power to pardon and the power to remove executive officers have been de-
fined as exclusively presidential. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (power to re-
move); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) (power to pardon). See supra
note 18. Thus, Congress may not legislatively limit the exercise of those powers.
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to ensure the President has the legal authority to act within those emer-
gencies. Again, the Constitution places primary responsibility in the
hands of Congress; the questions are whether Congress will exercise that
responsibility and whether its failure to do so risks a loss of the authority.
Dames & Moore v. Regan is consistent with the Jackson thesis.
C. Basic Structure and the Power to Make War
The basic structural framework described above is fully applicable
to the war-making context. Article I, section 8 of the Constitution places
considerable emphasis upon the war-making capacity of the national
government. That article provides:
Congress shall have Power... To raise and support Armies,
but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer
Term than two Years. . . ; To provide and maintain a Navy; To
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces; To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
[and] To provide for organizing arming, and disciplining, the Mili-
tia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the
Service of the United States .... 47
Of course, this language cannot be construed as granting Congress all
governmental authority over these matters. The power is vested in the
national government as a whole. Congress is given the legislative author-
ity over these enumerated substantive matters. And as indicated, that
legislative authority is quite significant in our republican form of govern-
ment. Congress defines the policy that the executive branch will execute.
Without action by Congress, there is no independent presidential war-
making power.
These clauses vest in Congress extensive practical power and re-
sponsibility to create and regulate armed forces. Hence, under its powers
to raise, govern, and regulate, Congress must make the initial determina-
tion of whether--or the extent to which-we should have armed forces,
the character of those forces and, it would seem, the general uses to
which those forces may be applied. The President may participate in this
determination through the executive branch's substantial power of per-
suasion and through the exercise of the veto. In other respects, the exec-
utive power arises only upon affirmative action taken by Congress.48 If
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, CIs. 12-16.
48. See supra text accompanying note 37. Of course, once the troops are armed, serious
consideration must be given to the executive's potential and proclivity to exercise practical
power. Here, as Justice Jackson recognized in Youngstown, congressional passivity may lead
to de facto accumulations of presidential power. See also United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,
236 U.S. 459, 474-75 (1915) (implied grant of authority).
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Congress fails to provide a particular weapons system, the President
lacks the constitutional power to procure that system. He also lacks the
general authority to use authorized forces or weapons in a manner incon-
sistent with specific congressional determinations. To conclude other-
wise would be to permit the President to assume a lawmaking authority
the Constitution plainly delegates to Congress. Of course, once the
armed forces are created and the arsenal is stockpiled, serious considera-
tion must be given to Justice Jackson's zone of twilight. To the extent
that Congress provides little or no guidance on the disposition of troops
or on the uses of weapons, the President will assume the power to dispose
of those troops and weapons as he deems appropriate.49 Patterns of con-
gressional acquiescence in presidential action will further bolster practi-
cal executive power. This acquired power is not, however, irretrievable,
since nothing in Justice Jackson's theory or in the Constitution prevents
Congress from recapturing lost turf.50
H. Allocations of the Power to Make War as Perceived by the
Framers and Through the Looking Glass of History
A. The Power to Raise Armies
The predominant authority of Congress was a recurring theme in
the Federalist Papers. This was particularly true with respect to the war-
making powers. In the Federalist Nos. 24 and 26, Alexander Hamilton
responded to charges that the Constitution was deficient in that it permit-
ted the national government to keep troops in time of peace and vested
the executive with plenary power to levy troops. Hamilton refuted the
first charge on policy grounds-the practical need for some military es-
tablishment-and refuted the second by demonstrating that the Consti-
49. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Ides, Congress, Constitutional Responsibility
and the War Power, 17 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 599, 616-42 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Constitu-
tional Responsibility].
50. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). Powell involved a challenge to the
exclusion of a member of Congress. In determining that this member's right to be seated had
been violated, the Supreme Court refused to give constitutional credence to prior exclusions
that had been based on similar factors. "The relevancy of prior exclusion cases is limited
largely to the insight they afford in correctly ascertaining the draftsmen's intent. Obviously,
therefore, the precedential value of these cases tends to increase in proportion to their proxim-
ity to the Convention in 1787." Id. at 547. In a similar vein, the Court stated, "That an
unconstitutional action has been taken before surely does not render that same action any less
unconstitutional at a later date." Id. at 546-47. The Court has also strongly suggested that
although a presidential pattern of practice had been acquiesced to long enough to give rise to
an implied grant of authority, United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474-75 (1915),
an express rejection or "disaffirmance" of that authority by Congress would rescind the im-
plied grant. Id. at 471, 479-83. See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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tution vested no such authority in the executive. Hamilton explained
that the Constitution lodged the power to raise armies with the legislative
branch, a branch whose composition would be controlled by the electo-
rate. Moreover, even that branch would have significant restraints
placed upon it. He wrote:
[T]hat the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the legisla-
ture, not in the executive; that this legislature was to be a popular
body, consisting of the representatives of the people, periodically
elected; and that.., there was to be found.., an important qualifi-
cation even of the legislative discretion, in that clause which for-
bids the appropriation of money for the support of an army for any
longer period than two years: a precaution, which, upon a nearer
view of it, will appear to be a great and real security against the
keeping up of troops without evident necessity. (Emphasis in
original.)"
The requirement that no appropriation for the army be for a period of
more than two years was, according to Hamilton, designed to obligate
Congress to actively oversee the armed forces and to determine at regular
intervals "the propriety of keeping a military force on foot."52
Today the appropriations limitation does not operate in the precise
fashion anticipated by Hamilton and the framers of the Constitution. As
a practical matter, a peacetime armed force equipped with a massive ar-
senal of nuclear weapons will be with us for the foreseeable future, re-
gardless of whether the appropriations for those forces are for two years
or for some other duration. However, the spirit of the appropriations
restraint and the role it was intended to play in the structure of authority
over military affairs is no less significant today than it was in 1787. It
indicates a strong constitutional directive that Congress is to retain pri-
mary jurisdiction over the armed forces and is to maintain a constant
vigil as the regulator of military activity.
For Hamilton, the proposed Constitution embodied the wisdom and
necessity of popular control over the military establishment as a reflec-
tion of historical experience.53 The only valid objection to a standing
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 153 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
52. In THE FEDERALIST No. 26, Hamilton stated:
The Legislature of the United States will be obliged by this provision, once at
least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force
on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the
matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not at liberty to
vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of an army; if they
were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence.
Id. at 168 (emphasis in original).
53. Using as an example the Revolution of 1688, Hamilton described the important tran-
sition from autocratic control over the military to the placement of that control in the legisla-
tive branch:
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army arose in the context of autocratic control over the military estab-
lishment. Our Constitution, Hamilton explained, reflected the lessons of
history and was specifically designed to prevent such a dangerous ac-
cumulation of power in any individual. Certainly our executive branch
would not be vested with such authority. In fact, the Constitution was
specifically designed to ensure that control over the military would be
retained by the representative branch and thus ultimately by the
people.54
In a passage fraught with irony for contemporary readers, Hamilton
disparaged the notion that the elected representatives of the people could
successfully undermine this carefully structured system of constitutional
authority and obligation.
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community require
time to mature them for execution. An army so large as seriously
to menace those liberties could only be formed by progressive aug-
mentations; which would suppose, not merely a temporary combi-
nation between the legislature and executive, but a continued
conspiracy for a series of time. Is it probable that such a combina-
tion would exist at all? Is it probable that it would be persevered in
and transmitted along, through all the successive variations in the
representative body, which biennial elections would naturally pro-
duce in both houses? Is it presumable, that every man, the instant
he took his seat in the national senate, or house of representatives,
would commence a traitor to his constituents and to his country?
Can it be supposed, that there would not be found one man, dis-
cerning enough to detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or hon-
est enough to apprise his constituents of their danger?15
These observations indicate a firm constitutional sense of the responsibili-
ties of Congress. Control over the uses to which a war machine may be
put is at the heart of congressional duty. In Hamilton's view, only a
traitor to our republican system of government would tolerate an abdica-
The patriots, who effected that memorable revolution, were too temperate and too
well informed, to think of any restraint in the legislative discretion. They were aware
that a certain number of troops for guards and garrisons were indispensable, that no
precise bounds could be set to the national exigencies; that a power equal to every
possible contingency must exist somewhere in the government; and that when they
referred the exercise of that power to the judgment of the legislature, they had ar-
rived at the ultimate point of precaution, which was reconcilable with the safety of
the community.
THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 166 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
54. See Bickel, Congress, the President and the Power to Wage War, 48 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 131, 132 (1972) (The framers "authorized Congress to 'raise and support Armies,' and
then tried to ensure that the exclusive power of Congress would be jealously guarded, by pro-
viding that no appropriation of money to raise and support armies 'shall be for a longer Term
than two Years.' ").
55. THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 169 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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tion of that responsibilty by handing that control to the President. In the
twentieth century, with our massive arsenals of destruction, Hamilton's
observations take on a more frightening dimension. The Constitution
compels Congress to actively exercise its delegated responsibilities over
the use and deployment of our military capabilities.
B. The Power to Declare War and the Power of the
Commander-in-Chief
During the Revolutionary War, the entire war-making power was
vested in the Continental Congress. The Articles of Confederation pro-
vided that "the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on
peace and war" was the prerogative of Congress.56 The Commander-in-
Chief of the Continental Army was appointed by the Congress and fully
answerable to it. The perception of the Framers, among them former
Commander-in-Chief George Washington, was that Congress as a delib-
erative body had proved itself ill-suited to the task of conducting war.57
As a consequence of this perception, the Framers lodged the power to
conduct war in the President as Commander-in-Chief. 8 In the words of
Hamilton:
Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war
most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the ex-
ercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war implies the
direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and
employing the common strength, forms an usual and essential part
in the definition of the executive authority.59
This power to direct the war effort did not, however, vest the President
with the constitutional authority to override the more pervasive authori-
ties of Congress, including the power of Congress to declare war. "The
President's power as Commander-in-Chief ... was simply the power to
issue orders to the armed forces within a framework established by
Congress."60
56. Articles of Confederation art. IX.
57. See J.T. FLEXNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON, IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 547-48
(1967); 1 J. MARSHALL, MARSHALL'S LIFE OF WASHINGTON 214 (2d ed. 1832); L. HENKIN,
supra note 36, at 33.
58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 provides: "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United States .. "
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 500 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
60. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 6 (1973). See also L. HENKIN,
supra note 36, at 50 ("There is little evidence that the Framers intended more than to establish
in the President civilian command of the forces for wars declared by Congress (or when the
United States was attacked)....").
Hamilton distinguished the powers of the President as Commander-
in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States from similar powers
of the king of Great Britain. Although the President's authority would
be nominally the same as that of the king of Great Britain, in substance it
is much inferior to it. The President's power, he wrote,
would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and
direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and Ad-
miral of the confederacy; while that of the British King extends to
the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and
armies; all which by the Constitution under consideration would
appertain to the Legislature. (Emphasis in original.)6 '
It would seem that in Hamilton's view, the friction between the
power of Congress to declare war and the power of the President to di-
rect the war effort once declared is negligible, no more severe than the
potential tension between the legislative and executive powers generally.
Congress makes policy by declaring war; it shapes that policy through
the breadth of the declaration and through the design of the military
apparatus it has created. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, exe-
cutes the policy within the framework created by Congress. To each
branch is granted the function most appropriate to the composition and
general purpose of that branch.
The President as Commander-in-Chief has some limited authority
to act unilaterally in emergency situations. Initial drafts of the Constitu-
tion, which gave Congress the power to "make war," were altered on the
motion of James Madison and Elbridge Gerry to give Congress the
power to "declare war." The purpose, according to Madison's notes, was
to make clear that the President, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief,
would have the authority "to repel sudden attacks."62 The published
records of the Federal Convention of 1787 indicate that the adopted lan-
guage was not meant to dilute congressional policymaking power, but
rather was a recognition of a special instance of executive competence to
represent the interests of the nation in directing the military.63 Just as a
deliberative body cannot effectively conduct a war, neither can it be ex-
pected to make tactical decisions designed to fend off sudden attacks or
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
62. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 318 (1966)
("Mr. M[adison] and Mr. Gerry moved to insert 'declare,' striking out 'make' war; leaving to
the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.") (notes of J. Madison) (emphasis in
original).
63. 5 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 438-39
(1845).
Winter 19861 NUCLEAR WEAPONS
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
to respond quickly to equivalent emergency situations." This recogni-
tion of a limited authority to repel sudden attacks was not meant to per-
mit the executive to engage in full-scale war in the absence of
congressional participation in that decision. Certainly, nothing in the
historical debates suggests this. Rather, the purpose was to permit the
President to take immediate action in defense of the nation, leaving to
Congress the authority to consider the appropriate long-term response.
President Thomas Jefferson recognized this distinction in authority
when he declined to permit the Navy to do anything other than disarm
an attacking vessel of Bey of Tripoli, who had declared war on the
United- States. In reporting to Congress on the altercation, Jefferson
stated:
Unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Con-
gress, to go beyond the line of defense, the vessel, being disabled
from committing further hostilities, was liberated with its crew.
The Legislature will doubtless consider whether, by authorizing
measures of offense also, they will place our force on an equal foot-
ing with that of its adversaries.65
Seen in this light, the power to repel sudden attacks is not an exception to
the overall separation of powers framework, but a responsible recogni-
tion of the relative functions of each branch.66 Indeed, the power would
likely have been implied even in the absence of Madison's notes and even
if the "make war" language had been retained.
In fact, the Madison and Gerry motion to alter the "make war"
language was made partly as a response to a suggestion by Pierce Butler
64. One must be careful not to impose a rigid, legalistic interpretation on the phrase "re-
pel sudden attacks." A rigid interpretation of the phrase is inconsistent with the intent of the
framers to grant the President some flexibility in emergency situations when Congress is un-
available to consider the appropriate military response. As has been observed, the President,
unlike Congress, is always in session and necessity dictates this accomodation to the unex-
pected. But this limited power was not designed to divest Congress of its predominant author-
ity over the military establishment and its uses. To conclude otherwise would be inconsistent
with the basic structure of the Constitution, as well as with the general republican philosophy
that animated the framers. Nonetheless, when Congress is both silent and unavailable as a
practical matter, the Constitution recognizes that the President has the power to take limited
initiatives within a framework designed by Congress, but leaves to Congress the ultimate deci-
sion on war.
The phrase "repel sudden attacks" is instructive in that it underscores the limited scope of
both the power and the appropriate presidential response as perceived by one of the most
respected and influential members of the Convention. It must be remembered, however, that
the wording is Madison's, not the Convention's. It expresses his sense, apparently shared by
others, that the President would be free to take some limited emergency military action in the
absence of specific authorization by Congress.
65. 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 327 (1897).
66. See Bickel, supra note 54, at 132.
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that the entire power to make war be vested in the President.6 7 Speaking
to this suggestion, Gerry observed that he "never expected to hear in a
republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war."68
Similarly, George Mason stated that he "was against giving the power of
war to the Executive, because [he was] not [safely] to be trusted with it;
or to the Senate, because [it was] not so constructed as to be entitled to it.
He was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating
peace.",69 There is no record of any support for the Butler position. In
adopting the Madison and Gerry motion, the Framers plainly rejected
Butler's suggestion of broad executive war-making authority. They rec-
ognized instead the President's power to order short-term military action
to preserve the status quo and thereby to protect Congress' ability to
exercise its constitutional authority to make a policy decision about the
appropriate long-term response. But nothing in this reasonable deference
to executive competence indicates an intent to alter the basic roles of the
legislative and executive branches.7 °
Addressing this issue from the congressional perspective, the power
to declare war is plainly a legislative function. It is listed among the
enumerated legislative powers in Article I, section 8 and its exercise in-
volves precisely the type of policy judgment that is the prerogative of the
representative branch. This power has been the focal point of considera-
ble debate. The issues have ranged from whether a particular conflict is a
war within the technical meaning of the clause and whether a particular
congressional action amounts to the required declaration, to the larger
question of whether declarations of war are outmoded in the modem
world.7 1 Although such inquiries are not without their validity, they do
not address the fundamental structural question now at issue: whether
67. M. FARRAND, supra note 62, at 318.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 319. See also id. (statement of Mr. Ellsworth) ("It shd. [sic] be more easy to get
out of war than into it.").
70. See also A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 3-6 (1973); Lofgren,
War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 675-77
(1972).
71. See, e.g., Wallace, The War-Making Powers: A Constitutional Flaw?, 57 CORNELL L.
REv. 719, 741-44 (1972). See generally Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting from a denial of certiorari); E. KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR 34-40 (1982); King &
Leavens, Curbing the Dog of War: The War Powers Resolution, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 55
(1977); Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE
L.J. 672 (1972); Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 55 B.U.L. REv. 19 (Special Issue 1970);
Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L. REv. 833 (1972); Van
Alstyne, Congress, the President and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1972); Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to
Combat, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1771 (1968).
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the grant to Congress of the power to declare war alters or affirms the
basic principle of separation of powers, a principle which gives Congress
the predominant lawmaking role in our government. When viewed along
with a proper understanding of the Commander-in-Chief's constitutional
powers, giving Congress the power to declare war plainly affirms that
principle. Indeed, it underscores the proposition that Congress has the
initial authority to define the nation's military establishment and to de-
termine the immediate execution of military policy."2
C. A Modern Gloss
From the persepective of the Framers, the office of Commander-in-
Chief, although created by the Constitution, derived the bulk of its power
from congressional action. Without Congress, the President would have
neither the forces with which to operate- assuming forces had been sup-
plied-nor the authorization to use those forces other than to repel sud-
den attacks. Yet, one cannot ignore the common perception that the
modem presidency is a repository of war-making authority.73 To the
extent that this perception is an observation of political reality, it cannot
be denied; to the extent that it assumes an alteration in constitutional
structure, it is demonstrably wrong.
The distinction between power conferred by the Constitution and
power conferred by Congress through the constitutional process must be
kept in mind. The former involves allocations of primary authority that
can be changed only through the amendment process; thus, Congress
will retain the constitutional power to dominate the nation's war-making
policy so long as the Constitution is not altered through that process.
The latter involves power conferred by Congress through the exercise of
those allocated authorities; such power can be delegated to the President
either expressly through legislation or impliedly through a combination
of general grants of authority and acquiescence in patterns of presidential
initiative. Dames & Moore demonstrates that in the foreign affairs con-
text, of which war-making is a species, implied grants derived from pat-
terns of presidential initiative and congressional passivity are common.
Indeed, in the twin fields of war and foreign policy, Congress no doubt
72. A declaration of war provides notice to the international community of an official
state of belligerency. Notice, however, is only one of the functions of a declaration of war.
The Framers clearly used the phrase in a more all-encompassing manner. As the statements of
James Madison, Elbridge Gerry, and George Mason indicate, the power to declare war in-
cluded the authority to determine whether the nation should engage in armed belligerency. See
supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. This is consistent with the republican notion that
such a momentous decision should rest in the representative branch.
73. See Constitutional Responsibility, supra note 49, at 616-20.
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has allowed considerable delegated power to accumulate in the executive
branch. Given political realities, reassertion of congressional authority
may prove no easy matter; however, nothing in the Constitution itself
prevents the effort.7 4
It has been argued that instances of presidential war-making have in
some way altered the basic constitutional structure or have put a "gloss"
on presidential power.75 To a large extent this theory concedes to the
President unilateral military authority that would not have been recog-
nized by the Framers. It is ostensibly based on a conception of a "living
constitution" adapting to the needs of a modem nation; but, in fact, the
opposite is the case. Considering the extreme rarity of Article V amend-
ments, this theory of constitutional prerogative through practice calcifies
the Constitution to permit only those patterns of practice consistent with
the perceived historical pattern. If the Constitution is truly meant to
survive for future generations and to be applied to new and unforeseen
circumstances, this theory, which has no textual referent in the Constitu-
tion or in the ratifying debates, is unacceptable. Although it supplies a
rationalizing principle for past practices, it provides almost no flexibility
for future contingencies.
On the other hand, the explanation of presidential power that recog-
nizes the scope of implied and express delegations both rationalizes past
practice and permits latitude for future contingencies. Moreover, it does
so in a manner consistent with constitutional structure. Specifically, this
theory permits Congress and the President the needed flexibility, within a
broad but definable framework, to alter patterns of practice that may
become unsuited or unacceptable to modern contingencies. There is no
need for constitutional amendment; the process of alteration occurs
through reasonable accommodations between the branches.
In this regard, the circumstances of many presidential military ex-
cursions-most of which have involved a relatively minor presidential
intrusion upon congressional prerogative-indicate a congressional ac-
ceptance and endorsement of the precise presidential initiative under-
taken. For example, each time a President orders the military rescue of
American citizens residing in a foreign country, Congress' failure to ob-
ject contributes to the perception that Congress, having conferred a mili-
tary force upon the President, has implicitly consented to or even
endorsed such uses of that force.76 Future presidents can be expected to
act upon that implied consent. Thus, absent specific legislation address-
74. See supra note 50; cf Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969).
75. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
76. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686.
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ing the point, presidential practices not objected to by Congress may al-
ter the political allocation of power by creating a presumed consent to
take limited initiatives in the military context.77 Moreover, a practice
long endured may require a specific repudiation before the consent will
be deemed withdrawn. But regardless of the difficulty of rescinding such
an implied grant of authority, its rescision is not dependent upon a con-
stitutional amendment.
With respect to larger military conflicts, the independent presiden-
tial war is more myth than reality. As stated by Professor Louis Henkin:
[I]t is increasingly difficult to make an authentic case that the Pres-
ident has taken the country into war without Congressional au-
thorization in advance or ratification soon after. Presidents cannot
use the armed forces for long in substantial operations without
Congressional cooperation; surely any action that can properly be
called war depends on Congressional appropriations and other
forms of approval, expressed or implied. Presidents who fought
these wars inevitably sought Congressional approval and invaria-
bly obtained it.
78
Thus, although President Polk may have ordered troops to cross the Rio
Grande in advance of congressional approval, Congress expressly en-
dorsed the President's action and declared war on Mexico.19 More re-
cently, in the Korean War, although Congress did not expressly declare
war, it plainly supported the war effort by appropriating substantial
funds toward accomplishment of the articulated goals."0 This willingness
to defer to executive initiative has certainly bolstered the practical and
political power of the President. It has not, however, altered the consti-
tutional structure. The executive branch gains no constitutional power
superior to Congress by taking action with which Congress explicitly or
77. See supra note 62.
78. L. HENKIN, supra note 36, at 100-01.
79. See Act of May 13, 1846, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 9 (An Act Providing for the Prosecution of
the Existing War Between the United States and the Republic of Mexico); Act of June 18,
1846, ch. 24, 9 Stat. 17 (Supplemental Act). Indeed, a member of Congress who took Presi-
dent Polk at his word may easily have concluded that U.S. troops had been subjected to unjus-
tified aggression by the Mexican military forces. See H.S. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 310-11 (1963) (Polk's Message on War with Mexico, May 11, 1846).
80. See, eg., Mutual Security Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-665, § 132 (1954); Mutual
Security Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-118, 67 Stat. 152 (1953); Department of Defense Appro-
priation Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 82-488, 66 Stat. 517 (1952); Mutual Security Act of 1951,
Pub. L. No. 82-165, § 301, 65 Stat. 373 (1951); Department of Defense Appropriation Act of
1952, Pub. L. No. 82-179, 65 Stat. 423 (1951); General Appropriation Act of 1951, Pub. L.
No. 81-759, Ch. X, 64 Stat. 595 (1950). See also L. HENKIN, supra note 36, at 89-123, 107 n.
43; Constitutional Responsibility, supra note 49, at 624-31.
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implicitly agrees."1 Willingness to support the President's policy objec-
tives does not necessarily indicate support for a broad interpretation of
the Commander-in-Chief's constitutional powers. And, of course, Con-
gress is free to rescind or alter its delegations to the President. 2
The United States' military involvement in Vietnam, perceived by
many as the quintessential presidential war, is instructive. Far from be-
ing a unilateral presidential military excursion, the war in Vietnam was
fully supported by Congress, both initially through the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, and in the long-term through the enormous military appro-
priations that Congress plainly intended for use in that war. While
American involvement in the Vietnam War may have been the result of
presidential initiative, that initiative was fully supported, although per-
haps not fully appreciated, by Congress."3 In adopting the Gulf of Ton-
kin Resolution, Congress may have acted precipitously and even
irresponsibly; these factors certainly contributed to the perception that
this was President Johnson's war. Although that perception may have
been correct politically, constitutionally the war was the nation's, sanc-
tioned by Congress and conducted by the President. Had Congress re-
fused to adopt the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution or had Congress
specifically forbidden an invasion of Vietnam, the President would not
have been free to proceed contrary to the will of Congress. 4 Far from
supporting an independent presidential war-making power, Vietnam un-
derscores the danger of a broad delegation of war-making authority to
the President.
Even if one assumes that the presidential initiatives described above,
including Vietnam, were undertaken in direct contravention of congres-
sional will, at most this indicates a violation of constitutional principles.
Certainly, constitutional violations cannot be considered an acceptable
form of constitutional amendment. Such usurpations of congressional
prerogative would indicate a need for a resurgence of congressional over-
sight, not a further abdication of responsibility.8 5
81. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680-82 (1981); United States v. Midwest
Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474-75 (1915).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 38-46; United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S.
459, 471 (1915).
83. L. HENKIN, supra note 36, at 101-02.
84. Id. at 101.
85. An analogous situation arose with respect to the Speech and Press Clause of the First
Amendment. From the Alien and Sedition Acts, adopted shortly after the formation of our
government, Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (Expired); Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596
(1798) (Expired), through the prosecutions under the Espionage Act during World War I,
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), to
many of the Smith Act prosecutions during the 1950s, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
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Despite the modem tendency to rely on the Commander-in-Chief as
a repository of independent war and policy-making authority, this has no
basis whatsoever in the Constitution or in the ratification debates. Nor
has any relevant historical practice irretrievably placed that power in the
President. A presidential power to make war may exist, but that power
is dependent upon a combination of the action and acquiescence of Con-
gress as well as the absence of specific statutory restraints.8 6
In discussing the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution,
Professor Louis Henkin observed:
Congress can surely prescribe for future uses of force in situations
amounting to war. As regards hostilities "short of war," it may be
that, although the President can use force if Congress is silent,
Congress can forbid or regulate even such uses of force, if only on
the ground that they might lead to war.
87
The longstanding silence of Congress in the face of presidential military
initiative gives the President leeway to act under similar circumstances in
the future. However, that silence does not preclude Congress from alter-
ing the course of power by taking specific action to limit seemingly in-
dependent presidential initiative in the military context.
Regardless of whether one accepts the theory that independent pres-
idential action derives its legitimacy from implied delegations by Con-
gress or the theory espoused by Justice Frankfurter that "executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before
questioned ... may be treated as a gloss on 'executive Power,' ,88 the
Stone proposal involves a practice that has not been "usurped" by the
President. Indeed, the proposal touches on a practice consistently exer-
cised by Congress each year as part of the legislative process-namely,
the determination of the shape, size and fighting potential of the military
establishment.89 At most, presidential initiative has established an in-
(195 1), the ideals of the First Amendment were honored only in the breach. See generally Z.
CHAFE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941). These practices, most of which have
been historically and judicially repudiated, did not mandate adherence to a system of govern-
ment in which repression of free speech was the standard. Rather, these unfortunate examples
of practices once upheld as constitutional serve as signposts in the development of constitu-
tional doctrine toward their eventual repudiation. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (per curiam); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
86. The War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1973) is an example of
such a restraint; whether it is an effective one is a separate question. See Constitutional Re-
sponsibility, supra note 49, at 631-52.
87. L. HENKIN, supra note 36, at 103.
88. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
89. For example, the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-
525, §§ 101-13, 201-07, 98 Stat. 2492, 2498-2510 (1984), places limitations on the procure-
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dependent authority to use the military in circumstances short of all out
war. By contrast, the power to define the profile of the military establish-
ment, from its size and configuration to its weaponry, has remained
firmly lodged in Congress.90 The annual budget battles over defense ap-
propriations and authorizations are a constant reminder of this very im-
portant and unrelinquished power of Congress.91
II. The Regulation of Nuclear Weapons
Extrapolating from the general principles discussed above, it is clear
that Congress, as the nation's lawmaking institution, possesses considera-
ble authority over our nuclear arsenal. A consideration of that authority
begins with the obvious proposition that if it were not for Congress, there
would be no nuclear arsenal.92 Regardless of the need for nuclear weap-
ons in the modem world and regardless of presidential support for such
weapons, the United States would possess no such arsenal were it not for
the accumulated actions of many congresses approving weapons systems
and appropriating money for those systems. If Congress had chosen to
ment, research, development, testing, and evaluation of weapons and weapon systems. One
specific limitation is found in section 110, which limits the number of operational MX missiles
that may be purchased by the executive branch. Another is found in section 111, which states,
"None of the funds appropriated pursuant to authorizations of appropriations in this title may
be used for procurement of binary chemical munitions, including advanced procurement of
long-lead components or for the establishment of a production base for such munitions." Still
another occurs in section 205, which defines the policy governing the testing of anti-satellite
warheads.
The Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-94, 97 Stat. 614
(1983), is similarly limiting. Section 110 of that Act specifies the location of deployment for
the MX missiles and requires the Secretary of the Air Force to prepare "a full draft and final
environmental impact statement" on the deployment. Section 206 prohibits the expenditure of
funds for "research, development, test, or evaluation" of a small mobile missile. Section 208
places a funding limit on mobile ballistic missile defense research. See also The Department of
Defense Appropriations Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-212, § 799H, 97 Stat. 1421, 1457-58
(1983) ("[N]o funds appropriated by this Act shall be expended for the research, development,
test, evaluation or procurement for integration of a nuclear warhead into the Joint Tactical
Missile System."); Department of Defense Continuing Appropriations Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 98-441, § 106(c), 98 Stat. 1699, 1700-01 (1984) (prohibits the executive branch from sup-
porting, "directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any na-
tion, group, organization, movement or individual").
90. See, eg., 10 U.S.C. § 138 (1982) (detailing the role of Congress in authorizing weap-
ons procurement and troop strength); 10 U.S.C. §§ 141-143 (creating the Joint Chiefs of Staff);
10 U.S.C. §§ 501-520a (regulating enlistments); 10 U.S.C. §§ 521-526 (officer strength and
distribution); 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2316 (procurement); 10 U.S.C. §§ 2352-2361 (research and
development).
91. See, ag., 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2241-46 (1981); 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
1155-59, 3107-10 (1982); 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RP. 2513-16 (1983); 42 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP. 2361-65, 2441-45, 2733-36, 3145 (1984); 43 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1798-99 (1985).
92. See supra notes 87-89.
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reject development of nuclear weapons technology, there is nothing in
the Constitution that would have permitted the President to override
that decision. Nor, as indicated above, is there any history of a presiden-
tial practice that would indicate to the contrary. It is, accordingly, be-
yond cavil that Congress may refuse a presidential request for a weapons
system.
Similarly, nothing in the Constitution, other than the practical effect
of a veto, would prevent Congress from eliminating or drastically reduc-
ing the present nuclear arsenal. The Constitution does not require that
the President, as Commander-in-Chief, be armed with the best weapons;
indeed, it does not require that he be armed with any weapons at all.
Although it is not probable that Congress would ever disarm the Presi-
dent, from a constitutional perspective Congress has that authority.
Congress defines the scope of the nation's military defense. It may do so
intelligently or foolishly; it may even do so inconsistently.93
This greater power to determine whether to arm the President in-
cludes the lesser power to legislate selectively and incrementally with re-
spect to particular types of armaments.94 Thus, Congress may refuse to
fund a particular weapon system, but at the same time provide a suffi-
cient appropriation to permit basic research on the efficacy of that sys-
tem. And, consistent with the Constitution, Congress could prohibit or
limit certain avenues of research or testing. The President is not free to
purchase the system merely because research had been funded, nor is he
free to extend the research to specific avenues forbidden by Congress.
Moreover, once a system is adopted, Congress need not give the Presi-
dent complete discretion over the use of that system. Congress could
stockpile a certain weapon on the express condition that the weapon not
be used until Congress authorized its use through legislation. Similarly,
Congress could go a step further and give the President the discretion to
use a weapon, but only upon the occurrence of a particular event.
An example of congressional regulation of a weapon system is found
in Chapter 32 of title 50 of the United States Code, entitled "Chemical
93. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978) (judiciary will
not appraise wisdom of course selected by Congress).
94. Cf United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 476 (1915) ("It is only necessary
to point out that, as the greater includes the lesser, the power to make permanent reservations
includes power to make temporary withdrawals.").
95. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1520 (1982) (limits use of human subjects for testing of chemical
or biological agents by the Department of Defense); Department of Defense Authorization Act
of 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-525, § 205, 98 Stat. 2492, 2509-10 (1984) (limitation on testing of anti-
satellite warheads); Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-94,
§ 206, 97 Stat. 614, 624 (1983) (limitation on research and development of small mobile
missile).
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and Biological Warfare Program."96 The pertinent sections of the code
limit the testing, transportation, deployment, storage and disposal of
chemical and biological weapons. Similarly, section 111 of the Depart-
ment of Defense Authorization Act, 1985," 7 provides: "None of the
funds appropriated pursuant to authorizations of appropriations in this
title may be used for procurement of binary chemical munitions, includ-
ing advanced procurement of long-lead components or for the establish-
ment of a production base for such munitions." This type of modified or
limited delegation presents no legitimate constitutional concern.98 Con-
gress can give all, nothing at all, or something in between.99
An analogous grant of seemingly limited constitutional authority is
found in the statute creating the Central Intelligence Agency."°° The
CIA, like a weapons system, is a tool provided by Congress to assist the
President in protecting the national security. Congress did not, however,
grant the President plenary power to determine all circumstances under
which the agency may be used. In fact, the enabling statute specifically
precludes the CIA from engaging in certain types of activities: "[T]he
Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or in-
ternal-security functions . ,,101 Regardless of any policy arguments
for expanding the operations of the CIA, nothing in the Constitution
prevents Congress from limiting those operations, and nothing in the
Constitution gives the President the authority to ignore the limitations.
96. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1511-1520 (1982).
97. Pub. L. No. 98-525, 98 Stat. 2492, 2507 (1984).
98. See also supra notes 87-88, 91; 50 U.S.C. § 82 (1982) (procurement of ships and
materials during war); 50 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (guided missiles); 50 U.S.C. §§ 511-515 (wind
tunnels).
99. It has been suggested that Congress' power to regulate the use of chemical weapons
may be more extensive than its power to regulate the use of nuclear weapons. The theory is
that because chemical weapons are made unlawful by treaty, Congress may enforce the treaty
by appropriate legislation. Comments of Professor John Norton Moore, delivered at a Sympo-
sium sponsored by the Federation of American Scientists and the Lawyers Alliance for Nu-
clear Arms Control: "First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Under the Constitution, Who
Decides?" (November 15-17, 1985). According to the argument, because there is no treaty
counterpart for nuclear weapons, Congress is not free to regulate their use. However, if this
argument against the regulation of nuclear weapons is based upon a perceived invasion of the
President's constitutional prerogative, Professor Moore's theory must be wrong. There is no
doctrine of alteration of constitutional structure by treaty. Cf Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957). Certainly a pure act of legislation which derives from specific grants of authority in
Article I, section 8 deserves the same constitutional respect afforded legislation enforcing a
treaty. If Congress may regulate and limit the procurement and use of chemical weapons, it
may do the same with respect to nuclear weapons regardless of whether that legislation is
attached to a treaty.
100. 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1982).
101. Id. at § 403(d)(3).
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Youngstown provides direct authority for this proposition. 1°2 Of course,
these limitations do not eliminate the potential for presidential circum-
ventions or evasions that may be occasioned by a lack of congressional
oversight. But evasions do not define the scope of constitutional power;
at most, they indicate areas in which Congress must reassess its grants of
authority. Moreover, as the Court observed in Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service v. Chadha, 103 "The courts ... can always 'ascertain
whether the will of Congress has been obeyed,' . . . and can enforce ad-
herence to statutory standards."
A second analogy of limited grants of authority derives from the
vast administrative law apparatus created by Congress and administered
by the executive branch. Through the creation of agencies such as the
Department of Transportation, the Environmental Protection Agency,
and the Department of Health and Human Services, Congress has
granted the executive branch broad authority to regulate diverse matters
of public interest. The discretion granted is not, however, unbounded.
Each agency has limits upon the scope of its authority as well as upon the
methods through which it may regulate.
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Au-
tomobile Insurance Co. '04 is a recent affirmation of this principle. There,
the Supreme Court held that the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration, an agency of the Department of Transportation, had ex-
ceeded its statutory authority when it revoked a motor vehicle safety
requirement involving passive restraints. The Court found that the
agency's decision had been arbitrary and capricious.'0 5 In arriving at
this conclusion, the Court explained that, among other things, an agency
rule is "arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider. ... 106 In short, Congress
defines the scope of executive branch authority. Consistent with this
structure, the Judicial Review Act,'07 which applies to most administra-
tive rulemaking, provides that agency action may be set aside if it is "ar-
bitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."' 018 Although the executive branch may attempt to circumvent
the limits imposed upon the action of these agencies, a party injured by
102. 343 U.S. at 588-89.
103. 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983) (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425
(1944)).
104. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
105. Id. at 46.
106. Id. at 43.
107. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982).
108. Id. at § 706(2)(A) (emphasis added).
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such a circumvention can successfully challenge the action before the
judiciary.10 9
Applying the above principles to the issue of nuclear weapons, it
seems that Congress possesses the constitutional authority to do any of
the following:
(1) Create a nuclear weapons arsenal (or expand the current one);
(2) refuse to create a nuclear weapons arsenal;
(3) eliminate the current nuclear stockpile;
(4) limit the nuclear arsenal to particular types of weapons (e.g.,
defensive only or offensive only);
(5) purchase a weapons system, but refuse to provide the practical
means for its use;
(6) purchase the system and the practical means to use it, but ab-
solutely forbid use of the system in the absence of implementing
legislation; or
(7) purchase the system and the practical means to use it, but per-
mit use only upon the occurrence of specific events.
Without regard to the wisdom of any of the above alternatives, the imple-
mentation of any one of them seemingly falls squarely within Congress'
constitutional authority to make basic policy determinations concerning
the nation's nuclear weapons system.
If the above seven possibilities are within the power of Congress to
implement, what can be said of Dr. Stone's proposal, which appears to
take a middle course between giving the President total control over the
nuclear arsenal and denying the President any such control? It appears
that the overall desuetude of the nondelegation doctrine, coupled with
the deference accorded the political branches in matters involving foreign
relations, would permit Congress to grant the President unfettered dis-
cretion to use nuclear weapons in the exercise of his powers as Com-
mander-in-Chief.110 Similarly, as explained above, nothing in the
Constitution or in any historical gloss on the Constitution requires Con-
gress to grant the President the authority to use such weapons. Because
either extreme is constitutional, it might seem that a middle ground
would be equally acceptable. But this intuition is not without its difficul-
ties. Even though Congress may regulate the use of nuclear weapons, it
must be careful to avoid methods that invade the province of the execu-
tive branch or that otherwise violate certain structural limitations found
109. The fact that the issues with which we now deal may involve political questions or
may be otherwise nonjusticiable does not diminish the constitutional inquiry. Indeed, the need
for Congress to protect with vigilance its legislative prerogative is intensified because that pre-
rogative may not be protectible through the judicial process.
110. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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in the Constitution. A middle ground approach, such as the Stone pro-
posal, must be carefully defined to avoid these pitfalls.
The Stone proposal may foster the objection that it invades the prov-
ince of the Commander-in-Chief by impinging on his authority to con-
duct war. Clearly, the Commander-in-Chief possesses the specific
authority to conduct war once declared by Congress and to conduct mili-
tary operations in any emergency amounting to a sudden attack. Indeed,
the precise reason for creating this power was to avoid the difficulties
experienced during the Revolutionary War when a committee of Con-
gress attempted to oversee day-to-day military operations." ' The Con-
stitution plainly reposes that authority in the President as Commander-
n-Chief.112
As demonstrated above, a blanket congressional prohibition on
the first use of nuclear weapons is constitutionally unobjectionable.
Although the prohibition affects the President's ability as Commander-
in-Chief to engage in military activities by refusing to grant him plenary
power over a particular weapon system, it does not invade the President's
constitutional prerogative to conduct war within the confines of the mili-
tary apparatus created by Congress. This prohibition is no more intru-
sive upon that domain than are limitations on the number of troops,
restrictions on the size of the Navy, or refusals to approve a new line of
jet fighters, all of which are decisions squarely within the congressional
policy-making prerogative.113 Constitutionally, the prohibition on first
use stands on the same footing as the foregoing examples of congres-
sional prerogative. The line between impermissible and permissible use of
weapons is clear and, most importantly, is based not upon day-to-day
tactics, but upon a congressional strategy or policy.
On the other hand, one can conceive of instances when congres-
sional regulation of the use of weapons, both nuclear and non-nuclear,
would transgress the Commander-in-Chief's constitutional authority to
conduct war. The distinction between what is permissible and what is
not lies in the difference between the creation of policy and the actual
execution of that policy. While there may be examples in which the dis-
111. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
112. Despite this allocation of authority, Congress has on at least one major occasion in-
jected itself into the conduction of operations. During the Civil War, the Committee on the
Conduct of the War was both a constant watchdog of the Union military campaign and an
intermittent meddler in the actual supervision of the war effort. Pierson, The Committee on
the Conduct of the Civil War, 23 AM. HIST. REV. 550 (1918). While this instance of congres-
sional interference with the Commander-in-Chief would not amend the Constitution, it does
indicate a degree of flexibility in defining the relative roles of the two branches.
113. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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tinction is amorphous, some guidance can be gleaned from more obvious
cases. For example, Congress would overstep the boundaries that sepa-
rate the legislative from the executive were it to require the Commander-
in-Chief to seek congressional or committee approval of daily war plans,
or more particularly, of daily weapons usage.' 14 The Commander-in-
Chief Clause was designed to prevent precisely this type of situation.
Congress in the above example is not defining policy but is administering
the operations that implement policy. The President would be correct in
challenging such an invasion.
The question now presented, therefore, is where Dr. Stone's propo-
sal lies on the spectrum between defining the scope of our nation's mili-
tary policy and excessive interference with the Commander-in-Chief's
authority to control the day-to-day operations of war. The answer de-
pends upon the nature of the proposed committee's authority. If that
authority includes a power to review or approve tactics in the context of
ongoing military operations, it treads upon the executive prerogative to
conduct the operations of war. On the other hand, if the role of the
committee would be to act as a surrogate of Congress in the determina-
tion of nuclear weapons policy, the likelihood of interference with the
President's constitutional prerogatives is diminished, if not eliminated
completely. If that policy decision were to permit a first strike, the Presi-
dent, as Commander-in-Chief, could then determine whether such a use
is an appropriate military response. In other words, the committee
would grant the President the flexibility to exercise the option of first use.
Based on this understanding of the committee's function, to require
committee approval of first use would not violate the separation of pow-
ers. Just as Congress is free to ban the first use of nuclear weapons, Con-
gress could pass legislation rescinding such a ban. The committee would
do no more. It would exercise a plainly legislative function in rescinding
a ban on first use. From the perspective of the President's constitutional
authority to conduct war, whether the committee or Congress as a whole
exercises the approval function is a constitutional irrelevancy." 5 Neither
case invades the province of the executive branch.
This characterization of the committee's authority should insulate
the proposal from a separation of powers challenge. It does, however,
give rise to another potential objection." 6 By permitting a committee to
114. But see supra note 112.
115. From a policy perspective, placing the approval power in a committee actually would
enhance presidential flexibility and power since the committee could meet in secret and vest
the President with first use capability without announcing the new policy to the enemy.
116. An additional constitutional objection to the proposal derives from the characteriza-
tion of committee approval as a legislative veto. Under a mechanical reading of INS v.
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exercise the authority to rescind a ban on first use, Congress may be im-
properly delegating its institutional responsibility to legislate in the war-
making context. Certainly, the committee would be given the authority
to determine the nation's policy with respect to the first use of nuclear
weapons, which is usually a job for Congress. Moreover, a presidential
request for first use would likely arise only under circumstances of animminent or ongoing military conflict. Considering the strategic effect of
using even a tactical nuclear weapon, approval of a request for first use
might be tantamount to a declaration of war." 7 As a consequence, this
excessive delegation objection is not frivolous.' 8
The power to declare war was carefully vested in Congress as a
whole. Certainly the remarks made during the Federal Convention of
1787 and the arguments presented in the Federalist Papers indicate a
strong sense that Congress alone, acting as a body, is to exercise the au-
thority to declare war and otherwise to define the nation's military pos-
ture. The war power is, after all, the most dangerous of all powers vested
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955-59 (1983), anything that can be characterized as a legislative veto is
immediately void. Whether that interpretation of Chadha is correct does not concern this
discussion, for in fact, no legislative veto would be exercised by this committee. By its very
nature, a legislative veto supposes that Congress has granted the executive branch the author-
ity to take certain action, but has, in addition, retained the power to prevent the exercise of
that authority. A "veto" is a condition subsequent that divests power. The Stone proposal is
quite different. It would impose a ban on first use except on the precondition of committee
approval. Any first use requires an affirmative action by the committee. Committee approval
is a condition precedent, which would rescind the ban and confer power.
This distinction is more than semantic. The difference between a condition subsequent
and a condition precedent has a time-honored status in jurisprudence: The former divests; the
latter confers. Moreover, the distinction has direct significance in the context of separation of
powers. The Supreme Court in Chadha recognized that a legislative veto had the potential of
treading upon the domain of the executive branch by injecting Congress into the daily adminis-
trative process: "Congress' authority to delegate portions of its power to administrative agen-
cies provides no support for the argument that Congress can constitutionally control
administration of the laws by way of a Congressional veto." 462 U.S. at 953 n.16. While this
concern may have been legitimate under the circumstances presented in Chadha, it has no
bearing on the questions now presented since the committee would play no role in the daily
affairs of the executive branch or hinder executive action. The committee would either grant
authority or refuse to do so and thus would determine policy which, as demonstrated above, is
a congressional prerogative. Once the approval is granted, the committee could not "veto" the
President's administrative response. Thus, although a veto such as that at issue in Chadha
could tread upon the executive domain, an approval, like any other piece of affirmative legisla-
tion, would not.
117. Stone, supra note 2, at 101, 103-04, 106.
118. Of course, as a technical matter the nondelegation doctrine involves excessive or
standardless delegations to the executive branch. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958);
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-42 (1935); Panama Ref.
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420-30 (1935). By analogy, however, it is conceivable that Con-
gress could excessively delegate its legislative authority to a committee. Cf Constitutional
Responsibility, supra note 49, at 620-26.
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in the national government and should be unleashed only after a thor-
ough consideration by both houses of the representative branch. More-
over, the requirement of full consideration of proposed legislation by
both houses of Congress was not an empty formalism. As James Wilson
observed at the Federal Convention:
Despotism comes on mankind in different shapes. sometimes [sic]
in an Executive, sometimes in a military, one. Is there danger of a
Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the
Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty
nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it within
itself, into distinct and independent branches. In a single house
there is no check, but the inadequate one, of the virtue & good
sense of those who compose it.119
The argument that the entire Congress must participate in the crea-
tion of policy is not easily refuted.' In exercising its powers, Congress
should be bound by the letter of the Constitution. However, when the
power to declare war is considered in the context of modem technology
and a potentially instantaneous nuclear exchange, the opportunity to
proceed in the traditional manner is evanescent at best. Split-second tim-
ing and secrecy may be of the essence. Because of these factors, the Pres-
ident, at the grace of Congress, now has the practical authority to use
nuclear weapons in any manner he deems consistent with his power as
Commander-in-Chief. Although this state of affairs may satisfy the very
limited legalistic norms of nondelegation in the foreign affairs context, it
severely strains congressional responsibility over the war powers. Cer-
tainly, it does nothing to advance the constitutional virtue of full consid-
eration by both houses of Congress on the question of war. Thus it
would seem to make good constitutional sense that Congress should be
free to create an option that falls somewhere between this current nega-
tion of responsibility and an unrealistic insistence that Congress as a
whole answer the first use question in the context of an ongoing conflict.
Dr. Stone's proposal may present that option.
Finally, the Necessary and Proper Clause suggests that Dr. Stone's
proposal is well within the bounds of constitutional reason and structure.
The Necessary and Proper Clause provides: "The Congress shall have
power... To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers.... . 2" One of those "fore-
going powers" is the power to declare war. If the development of nuclear
119. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 62, at 254 (remarks of James Wilson). See also THE
FEDERALIST Nos. 22 & 51.
120. See, eg., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-59 (1983).
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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technology has so transformed the power to declare war that Congress
cannot effectively exercise it in the traditional fashion, the Necessary and
Proper Clause would seem to provide ample authority to support Con-
gress' creation of some reasonable method for exercising that power.
Such flexibility has long been an accepted part of constitutional
jurisprudence.
In McCulloch v. Maryland, '22 Chief Justice John Marshall observed:
[A] government, entrusted with such ample powers, on the due
execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so
vitally depends, must also be entrusted with ample means for their
execution. The power being given, it is the interest of the nation to
facilitate its execution. It can never be their interest, and cannot be
presumed to have been their intention, to clog and embarrass its
execution by withholding the most appropriate means.' 23
In explaining and applying this principle, Chief Justice Marshall
stated that Congress was free to "exercise its best judgment in the selec-
tion of measures to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the
government," and to "avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and
to accomodate its legislation to circumstances."' 24 In other words, the
Necessary and Proper Clause presumes that the framers could not antici-
pate every possible problem that would challenge subsequent genera-
tions.1 25 Those generations would have ample latitude to solve the
unique dilemmas that confronted them. Of course, the solutions must be
consistent with the general structure and limitations of the Constitution.
But the structure of the Constitution need not be interpreted as a
straitjacket.
With this interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause in
mind, the committee proposal appears to be well within constitutional
bounds. It provides a limited but workable method through which Con-
gress may exercise its constitutional responsibility over potential nuclear
war, while not completely disarming the nation in the face of unforeseen
circumstances. The Framers adopted a structure of government based
on the premise that Congress would retain authority over war-making
decisions; legislation adopted by Congress that tends to advance that
aim, especially when perfect realization of the Framers' goal is impossi-
122. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
123. Id. at 408.
124. Id. at 420, 415-16.
125. In this sense, the Necessary and Proper Clause is a lesson in humility. The Framers
did not presume to be political soothsayers; similarly, in construing the scope of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, we should not presume to know exactly how the Framers would have
solved modem problems, of which they had little ken.
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ble, can hardly be said to be beyond the scope of the Necessary and
Proper Clause.
I would add the following polish to the proposal. The committee
should not be empowered to approve first use unless it finds that Con-
gress as a whole is unavailable to decide the first use question, either
because of the short notice on which the decision must be made or be-
cause an immediate military crisis creates an overriding need for absolute
secrecy. This additional condition would limit the authority of the com-
mittee to the narrow purpose for which it was created-to act as a surro-
gate for Congress under circumstances in which the national security
prevents Congress from addressing a question requiring an immediate
response.
Seen in this light, the proposal does not generally rearrange the leg-
islative procedures of Congress, nor does it create a precedent for a radi-
cal change in the legislative process. Rather, it creates a limited
exception to the general rule that on matters of military policy the pri-
mary responsibility belongs to Congress as a whole. It should also be
made clear that the role of the committee would extend beyond the ap-
proval or denial of the first use option. The committee would exercise an
oversight function on matters that could affect the potential use of nu-
clear weapons. Fulfillment of this function would further preserve the
congressional prerogative by informing Congress of the need to adopt
specific measures to ensure that the nation retains effective military op-
tions other than the nuclear one. Thus, while the proposal creates a nar-
row exception to the traditional legislative process, it also reaffirms the
importance of that process.126
Undeniably, the proposed committee would alter the normal re-
quirement of full congressional participation in decisions affecting mili-
tary policy. This alteration is not to be taken lightly. Certainly, the
Necessary and Proper Clause should not serve as a basis for the whole-
126. Although not a perfect analogy, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United
States Senate operates in a similar fashion. See S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
Among other things, the purpose of that committee is "to provide vigilant legislative oversight
over the intelligence activities of the United States to assure that such activities are in conform-
ity with the Constitution and laws of the United States." Id. However, although the President
is required to keep both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House "fully and currently informed" on new and ongoing
intelligence activities, 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (1982), fulfillment of this duty is not a condition
precedent to the initiation of intelligence activity. Id. By contrast, the device of committee
approval proposed by Dr. Stone would operate as a condition precedent to presidential action.
See supra note 116. This distinction is justifiable, since upon notification of an intention to use
nuclear weapons the committee would not likely have the luxury of reporting to Congress on
the need for an appropriate legislative response.
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sale reordering of constitutional structure. In Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service v. Chadha,127 the majority correctly observed that
convenience or efficiency were not, in themselves, sufficient to overcome
the limitations implicit in specific constitutional provisions. According
to the majority in Chadha, that the legislative veto at issue there was a
"useful 'political invention'" was a constitutional irrelevancy. 128 Here,
by contrast, the device of committee approval is more than convenient,
efficient or useful. It is created to ensure that constitutional structure is
honored to the fullest extent possible. Rather than rearranging the rela-
tive roles of each branch, it seeks to preserve the constitutionally man-
dated roles.' 29 Without the committee, the congressional responsibility
goes to the President by default.
In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall found that the
power to adopt appropriate means to attain the broad ends of the na-
tional government was implicit in our constitutional structure. He also
construed the Necessary and Proper Clause consistently with this struc-
tural conclusion. "To employ the means necessary to an end, is generally
understood as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and
not as being confined to those single means, without which the end would
be entirely unattainable."' 30 Importantly, the "degree of its necessity" is
to be determined by Congress.13 ' If Congress deems creation of this
committee vital to the exercise of one of its most important functions,
nothing in the Constitution prevents its implementation. An otherwise
legitimate objection to alterations based on convenience should not be
used to prevent a narrow modification based on stark necessity. In addi-
tion, if Congress can, consistent with the Constitution, conclude that the
decision on first use should be delegated to the President, there is no
constitutional basis for claiming that a similar delegation to a committee
is somehow excessive. Certainly, the delegation to the President under-
mines the bicameralism requirement to a greater extent than would com-
mittee approval. In any event, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives
Congress the authority to choose between these two constitutional
alternatives.
127. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
128. Id. at 945, 959.
129. See id. at 953-54 n.16.
130. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413-14.
131. Id. at 423.
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Conclusion
Dr. Stone's proposal creates a limited exception to the general rule
that Congress as a whole should make determinations on matters of mili-
tary policy. The exception arises out of necessity, not out of convenience.
Since the role of the proposed committee is clearly legislative-to create
military policy with regard to the first use of nuclear weapons-the exer-
cise of committee power would not invade the constitutional province of
the President as Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, given the flexibility
provided by the Necessary and Proper Clause and assuming that the
committee would respect the limits of its authority, exercise of this power
by the committee would not undermine the constitutional prerogatives of
Congress. In fact, the proposal, in both purpose and effect, serves to
place the constitutional responsibility for the nation's nuclear weapons
policy as close as possible to its structural home.

